

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SANA 00332 020610Z

15

ACTION PM-04

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15

CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 L-03 AID-05 EB-07 OMB-01

TRSE-00 ACDA-05 MC-02 /079 W
----- 005465

R 011400Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY SANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7249

INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMTM DHAHRAN

USAS RIYADH

EUCOM

SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SANA 0332

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, YE

SUBJECT: MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR YAR

REF: JIDDA 0659

SUMMARY: SAUDI PLAN FOR MILITARY MODERNIZATION OF YARG
FORCES HAS MANY PLUSES AND A FEW CONS. BALL IS IN OUR
COURT NOW.

1. TO JUDGE BY REFTTEL, SAUDIS HAVE PRODUCED VERY RPT
VERY WELL THROUGHTOUT PLAN FOR MILITARY MODERNIZATION
OF YAR FORCES. SAUDI PLAN IS MUCH MORE THAN AN
EQUIPMENT LIST. PLAN STARTS WITH UNIT ORGANIZATION,
APPARENTLY IN EFFORT TO BRING SAUDI AND YEMEN TOE'S INTO
LINE AS WELL AS DEFINE EXACTLY WHAT IS NEEDED
AND WHAT ITS USE WILL BE.

2. MOREOVER, BY CAREFULLY BUILDING IN COMPATIBILITY
OF SAUDI AND YEMENI EQUIPMENT, AND OFFERING TO MAKE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SANA 00332 020610Z

SOME DELIVERIES FROM SAUDI STOCKS, PLAN HAS CLEARLY

FOCUSSED ON BOTH SHORT TERM IMPACT AND LONG TERM SUPPLY
RELATIONSHIP THAT WILL SERVE CRUCIAL POLITICAL PURPOSES.
IN THE SAME VEIN, BY FOCUSSED ON INFANTRY, ARTILLERY
AND WE ASSUME SOME ARMOR (FROM THE FRENCH) SAUDIS HAVE
SHREWDLY CHOSEN MILITARY UNITS WITH KEY LOCAL IMPORTANCE.
THESE ARE THE COUP MAKERS, NOT THE AIR FORCE,
AND THE BASIS OF POWER FOR ANY YEMENI PRESIDENT. THEY
ARE ALSO AREAS WHEPE LONGTERM SOVIET TRAINING AND
EQUIPMENT SUPPLY HAVE BUILD UP CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE,
PRESENCE.

3. PLAN IS ALSO SENSIBLE IN STRESSING TRAINING, YEMENI
ABILITY TO ASSIMILATE EQUIPMENT, AND WHILE TIME
SPAN OF FIVE YEARS MAY SEEM LIKE A LONG TIME TO YEMENIS,
DOUBT THAT IT IS EXCESSIVE. SOVIETS HAVE BEEN TEACHING
ARTILLERY HERE FOR YEARS AND OUR BEST ESTIMATE IS THAT,
AT PRESENT, YEMENIS HAVE NO RPT NO CAPABILITY
CONTROL INDIRECT FIRE OR DO MUCH MORE THAN TAKE
OFF AND LAND IN MIG'S.

4. FINALLY, AND TO SOME EXTENT OFF-SETTING LONG
TIME FRAMES, SAUDI PLAN HAS IMPRESSIVE BULK.
IT DOES NOT EQUAL THE SOVIET OFFER IN NUMBER, SPEED
OF DELIVERY OR SOPHISTICATION OF EQUIPMENT, BUT IN
VIEW OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TIES BETWEEN SAG AND
YARG, WE THINK SAUDI MODERNIZATION PLAN IS SUFFICIENT
TO PUT SOVIETS ON DEFENSIVE, PARTLY BECAUSE IT
PROBABLY IS WITHIN SAUDI CAPABILITY TO ADMINISTER.

5. THERE ARE SOME DRAWBACKS TO THE PLAN, OF COURSE.

6. YEMENIS MAY NOT LIKE SAUDI PLAN TO REDUCE BRIGADES
FROM 12 TO 6. BRIGADE COMMANDS HAVE IMPORTANT POLITICAL
IMPLICATIONS. SOVIETS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY RESIST
TOOTH AND NAIL ANY EFFORT TO PRISE YEMENIS AWAY
FROM SOVIET ORGANIZATION, TACTICS, DOCTRINE, OF COMMAND
AND CONTROL. UP-SHOT IN SHORT RUN MAY BE SOME SAUDI
TYPE BRIGADES, SOME SOVIET TYPE. CONSISTENCY IS NOT
RPT NOT YEMENI FAILING.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SANA 00332 020610Z

7. PLAN IS ALSO LIGHT ON AIRCRAFT. FOUR TRAINERS IN
NEXT TWO YEARS LEAVES THIS AREA ENTIRELY OPEN TO
SOVIETS, EVEN IF SAUDIS MAKE OFF WITH MOST OR BEST
OF EXISTING YEMENI PILOTS FOR RETRAINING IN SAUDI
ARABIA. PLAN ERRS IN NOT TALKING, AT LEAST,
ABOUT FIGHTER DELIVERIES. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE
SAUDIS TO OFFER AN ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO SOVIETS
IN AIRFORCE AS IN OTHER AREAS, EVEN IF THEY CANNOT

MATCH DELIVERY RATES IN THE SHORT RUN. ALTERNATIVE
COULD EASILY HAVE THE EFFECT OF DEFLECTING YEMENIS
FROM FURTHER SOVIET ENTANGLEMENTS.

8. SAUDI PLANS REGARDING ARMOR ARE NOT YET ALTOGETHER
CLEAR. WHILE THEY HAVE INDICATED A CLEAR INTENTION
TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ARMORED CARS OF FRENCH MANUFACTURE,
THEIR LACK OF A CLEAR UNDERTAKING TO PROVIDE TANKS MAY
ALSO DISAPPOINT THE YEMENIS. EVEN IF THEY
DO AGREE TO SUPPLY TANKS--PRESUMABLY FROM FRENCH
SOURCES--THE SAUDIS MAY LACK THE ABILITY OR DESIRE
TO PRESS THE FRENCH FOR DELIVERY SCHEDULES WHICH
WOULD OFFER THE YEMENIS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO FURTHER
PROCUREMENT OF SOVIET ARMOR.

9. SAUDIS ADMITTEDLY ARE NOT ABANDONING FIELD TO
SOVIETS IN AREA OF AIRCRAFT. THEY ARE PROVIDING
TRAINERS AND HELOS AND WILL BUILD AIRFIELDS. THEY WILL
TRY TO TAKE BEST PILOTS TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR TRAINING.
AND IN ACQUIESCING (APPARENTLY) IN LARGE SOVIET ROLE IN
AIR FORCE, THEY ARE SETTING UP SOVIETS FOR
TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS WHICH SHOULD
BE MOST DIFFICULT IN WHOLE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.
STILL, WE THINK PLAN ERRS IN NOT TALKING ABOUT FOLLOW-
ON F5'S.

10. ANOTHER PROBLEM--WHICH SAUDIS CLEARLY MOVING TO
SOLVE--IS PLAN IMPLEMENTATION. SAUDI SECURITY ASSISTANCE
STAFF IN SAUDI ARABIA, AND MILITARY MISSION HERE,
IS KEY ELEMENT IN SOLVING DOZENS OF LIKELY PROBLEMS
WHICH, UP TO NOW, HAVE BEEN DEALT WITH AT SOMETIMES
CUMBERSOME SAB MINISTERIAL LEVAL. IT WOULD CREATE F AORUM
OR CHANNEL WHICH USG COULD USE TO DISCUSS YEMENI

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SANA 00332 020610Z

PROBLEMS OR IDEAS AT EMBASSY OR USMTM STAFF LEVEL,
WITHOUT REQUIRING DEMARCHE BY OFFICIALS WHO HAVE MUCH
MORE PRESSING USG-SAG BILATERAL ISSUES TO DEAL WITH.

1. ANOTHER PROBLEM IN IMPLEMENTATION ALSO CONCERNS
DELIVERY. WE THINK SAUDI IDEA OF SUPPLYING YAR FROM
ITS OWN STOCKS BASICALLY A POLITICAL MOVE, ALTHOUGH
IT ALSO OPENS UP SPEEDIER LOGISTICS AT OUTSET THROUGH
USE OF TRANSFER DEVICE. INsofar AS IT TIES YEMENIS
CLOSER TO THE SAUDIS WE THINK IT IS GOOD IDEA.
PROBLEM WE SEE IS THAT ROADS CONNECTING YEMEN AND
NORTH WON'T BE FINISHED FOR ANOTHER THREE YEARS.
IN MEANTIME TRUCKS FROM SAUDI ARABIA WOULD HAVE
TO TRAVERSE EASTERN DESERTS OR TIHAMA, OR
GOODS WILL HAVE TO BE TRANSHIPPED THROUGH JIZAN

AND HODEIDA. THIS WILL BE SLOW AT TIME WHEN PREMIUM IS GOING TO BE ON RESPONSIVENESS. FOR THIS REASON WE THINK WE SHOULD URGE SAUDIS FOR FIRST YEAR OR TWO TO ACCEPT DIRECT DELIVERIES FROM US TO YEMEN. ONCE NEW EQUIPMENT LINES ARE ESTABLISHED HERE, ALONG WITH SAUDI CREDIBILITY, FOLLOW-ON PROGRAM SPARES AND NEW END ITEOS MIGHT WELL DRAW ON SAUDIS STOCKS AND, HOPEFULLY, ON IMPROVING ROAD SYSTEM.

12. BUT BIGGEST PROBLEM CONCERNING DELIVERY IS WHAT WE CAN DO TO PUT TOGETHER IMPACT PACKAGE. SAUDIS CAN HELP WITH TRANSFERS FROM THEIR OWN STOCKS, AS THEY HAVE ALREADY DONE IN CASE OF TWELVE 105 MM HOWITZERS. BUT BALL IS IN OUR COURT TO COME UP WITH IMPACT PACKAGE THAT REALLY HAS IMPACT AND CAN BE DELIVERED FAIRLY SOON. WE ARE GUESSING, BUT IT MAY TAKE UP TO 60 DAYS TO OBTAIN PRICE AND AVAILABILITY DATA. PREPARATION OF LOA'S MAY TAKE 30-60 DAYS, GETTING THEM SIGNED WILL TAKE AT LEAST AS LONG AND, EVEN UNDER THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES FIRST SURFACE DELIVERIES (WHETHER LARGE OR SMALL) MIGHT TAKE ANOTHER 60-90 DAYS. THUS REALISTIC PERIOD FOR FIRST DELIVERY MIGHT BE NINE MONTHS AND COULD BE IN 1977.

13. EMBASSY EXPECTS TO SUBMIT MESSAGE SHORTLY THROUGH DATT CONCERNING TRAINING. THERE ARE CERTAIN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 SANA 00332 020610Z

AREAS WE CAN MOVE INTO IMMEDIATELY BUT OTHER TRAINING WILL HAVE TO BE GEARED TO EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES.
RANSOM

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY ASSISTANCE, MILITARY EQUIPMENT, DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 01 FEB 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: blochd0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976SANA00332
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760038-0575
From: SANA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760293/aaaadeju.tel
Line Count: 204
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION PM
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 76 JIDDA 659
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: blochd0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 MAY 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 MAY 2004 by ellisoob>; APPROVED <22 OCT 2004 by blochd0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR YAR
TAGS: MASS, YE, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006